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The familiar principles of established law relating to statu-
tory construction remained unchanged during the period cov-
ered by this survey. There were, however, quite a number of
cases involving the application of those principles to situations
of more than passing interest.
The statutes relating to mechanics' liens were construed at
length in Lowndes Hill Realty Company v. Greenville Concrete
Company.' That case presents without question the most
painstaking job of statutory construction accomplished by the
Court during this period. The entire legislative history of the
statutes relating to mechanics' and materialmen's liens com-
mencing with the 1816 enactment was reviewed for the pur-
pose of determining primarily (1) whether a subcontractor
must give to the owner the notice provided for in § 45-254 of
the 1952 Code before furnishing the materials and (2)
whether materialmen and mechanics who perfect liens take
in the order of their priority or pro rata. The Court decided
(1) that the notice requirement could be met by the service
upon the owner of a proper certificate of lien so that notice
before furnishing material was unnecessary and (2) that
materialmen and mechanics perfecting their liens must take
pro rata. In the course of its analysis of the history of legis-
lation in the field, the Court noted that the codification of the
Code beginning in 1922 had made applicable to subcontractors,
laborers and materialmen provisions which in their original
enactments had related only to the prime contractor. The
Court, however, in construing the 1952 Code said that there
was no ambiguity in it and that resort could not be had to
original enactments for interpretation, citing Town of Forest
Acres v. Seigler2 and State v. Connally.3
*Member of the firm of Belser and Belser, Columbia; A.B. and M.A.,
1940, University of South Carolina; LL.B., 1948, Yale University Law
School; member Richland County, South Carolina and American Bar
Associations.
1. 229 S. C. 619, 93 S. E. 2d 855 (1956).
2. 224 S. C. 166, 77 S. E. 2d 900 (1953).
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The nearest thing to judicial double talk in this field ap-
pears in Gregory, et al. v. Rollins, Chairman, Board of Direc-
tors of Lancaster County, et al.4 At the engagement of a
grand jury of Lancaster County, approved by the Circuit
Judge, a certified public accountant and an attorney con-
ducted an audit of the affairs of the County. Since no money
was forthcoming from the County to pay for their services,
the Circuit Judge, upon petition of the accountant and the
attorney, issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Board of
Directors, the County Treasurer and the Legislative Delega-
tion to issue and pay warrants in satisfaction of their claims.
The claim was made pursuant to § 38-409 of the 1952 Code
providing, in part, that "Grand juries may... employ ...
accountants [to audit the affairs of a county] and . . . fix
the amount of compensation or per diem to be paid therefor,
upon the approval of the presiding or circuit judge given
before any expert is employed". The Supreme Court denied
the power of the Circuit Judge to issue the writ of mandamus,
saying that to do so would amount to appropriation of public
funds - a matter within the exclusive domain of the Legis-
lature.5 The Court conceded, however, that the courts may
by mandamus require the proper officials of a county to
include a proper claim against the county in their next budget
for county expenses to be submitted to the General Assembly,6
or to pay a claim out of funds in the hands of the treasurer
belonging as a matter of law to the claimant and not to the
county.7 Perhaps the claimants should next follow the Green
v. West route and attempt to compel the proper officials,
through mandamus, to include the claim in the next budget
for county expenses. That, according to the Court, would not
amount to an "appropriation".
The case is of interest in the field of Statutory Construction
primarily in that it illustrates the construction of conflicting
statutes which are in pari materia. In reaching the foregoing
result the Supreme Court adverted to the supply bill for the
county for the year involved (the supply bill provided funds
for a routine audit) to show that the Legislature contemplated
only one audit for the year. The Supreme Court said that
§ 38-409 and the supply bill were in pari materia so far as
4. 230 S. C. 269, 95 S. E. 2d 487 (1956).
5. S. C. Const., Art. X, § 9.
6. Green v. West, 161 S. C. 161, 159 S. E. 23 (1931).
7. Scott v. Anderson County, 195 S. C. 92, 10 S. E. 2d 359 (1940).
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they related to the audit of the books of the county for the
year involved, that therefore they must be construed together,
and that the supply bill, being "special", must prevail over
§ 38-409, which was "general", where the two conflict.s
Another guide for the construction of enactments appar-
ently contradictory can be found in Griggs v. Hodges," relat-
ing to the establishment of a hospital in Chesterfield County.
By joint resolution approved January 26, 1955, the General
Assembly directed a referendum to be held in Chesterfield
County as to whether a hospital would be established "to be
located in or near the Town of Chesterfield". By an act
passed several months later a Board was created to construct
the hospital but no restrictions were included in the act as
to the site of the hospital. The hospital was in fact finally
put near Cheraw, and the action of the Board was attacked
as being contrary to the referendum. After detailed consid-
eration of the two enactments the Supreme Court said that
while it saw no repugnancy between them, it was well estab-
lished that the last enactment would prevail. 10
There were three other cases in the field. In Field v. Greg-
ory" the Supreme Court, in order to uphold a judge's charge
to the jury in the words of a statute, applied the elementary
principle of statutory construction that words used in a stat-
ute should be taken in their ordinary and popular signifi-
cation unless something in the statute required a different in-
terpretation. In Beard v. South Carolina Tax Commission12
the Court, in construing the income tax statute, adverted to
the same principle and declared that the word "income" as
used in a tax statute is to be taken in its ordinary sense of
gain or profit. The Court also said that a tax statute is not
to be construed to extend beyond the clear import of its lan-
guage, and that any substantial doubt as to its meaning
should be resolved against the Government and in favor of
the taxpayer. In Dantzler v. Callison 3 the Supreme Court
construed a 1956 Act of the General Assembly repealing all
or part of the existing law relating to the practice of naturo-
8. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. South Carolina Public Service
Authority, 215 S. C. 193, 54 S. E. 2d 777 (1949).
9. 229 S. C. 245, 92 S. E. 2d 654 (1956).
10. Ward v. Cobb, 204 S. C. 275, 28 S. E. 2d 850 (1944) ; South Caro-
lina Electric & Gas Co. v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 215
S. C. 193, 54 S. E. 2d 777 (1949).
11. 230 S. C. 39, 94 S. E. 2d 15 (1956).
12. 230 S. C. 357, 95 S. E. 2d 628 (1956).
13. 230 S. C. 75, 94 S. E. 2d 177 (1956).
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pathy. The 1956 Act provided in the first sentence of the
principal section that it was "unlawful for any person whether
heretofore licensed or not ... to practice naturopathy" and
in the remainder of the section provided that a person quali-
fied as a medical doctor could practice medicine. Faced with
an apparently large body of law that the right to practice
a profession is a property right entitled to protection and sev-
eral of its own decisions to the effect that naturopathy was
recognized as such, the Court cleverly construed the statute
as one imposing additional qualifications upon those who
would practice naturopathy rather than as one banning the
profession. The Court in reaching that decision said that all
statutes relating to one subject should be construed as in ioari
materia. The case did not, however, involve the application
of any new or different principles of statutory construction.
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